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Abstract
As platform ecosystems such as Facebook or
Twitter are rapidly growing through platform users’
data contribution, the importance of data governance
has been highlighted. Platform ecosystems, however,
face increasing complexity derived from the business
context such as multiple parties’ participation. How to
share control and decision rights about data assets
with platform users is regarded as a significant
governance design issue. However, there is a lack of
studies on this issue. Existing design models focus on
the characteristics of enterprises. Therefore, there is
limited support for platform ecosystems where there
are different types of context and complicated
relationships. To deal with the issue, this paper
proposes a novel design approach for data governance
in platform ecosystems including design principles,
contingency factors and an architecture model. Case
studies are performed to illustrate the practical
implications of our suggestion.

1. Introduction
Platform is defined as the building blocks that act
as a foundation upon which an array of firms [1]. It is
sometimes called a business ecosystem or platform
ecosystem (PE). PE has recently become a key
business trend in industry. Sustainable growth of PEs is
enabled through network effects which are based on
the interaction of multiple participating groups [2-4].
As the popularity of PEs and the value of data in PEs
are increasing, the concern about data abuse or misuse
is also growing. Therefore, the role of data governance
in PEs has received attention since it encourages
desirable behavior of all participating groups [5].
Data governance refers to who holds the decision
rights and is held accountable for decision-making
about data assets [9]. Traditional data governance
focuses on data assets within an enterprise, and
therefore there are simple and clear relationships to be
addressed. Data governance for PEs, however, should
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consider the different business context and concepts as
there are the multi-sided networks of participating
groups and the interactions between them [5]. How to
partition the decision rights and power of a PE between
a platform owner and platform users, therefore,
becomes a big challenge [6, 10]. However, there is
limited research on this issue. According to the
analysis on 19 existing industry and academic
governance frameworks [5], most of them focus on inhouse control for an enterprise. There lacks
consideration of external participating groups which
contribute and/or use data in PEs. An elaborate
analysis of the interaction of roles and responsibilities
and the design of decision-making structures in the
context of PE is missing. Prior studies on platform
governance largely neglect the importance and role of
data [5, 10]. Those claimed issues are derived from a
lack of understanding and consideration of data in PEs,
and the underlying complicated relationship caused by
multiple participating groups [10]. Designing data
governance helps deal with the complexity of PEs, and
focus on identifying fundamental considerations [9].
Architecture is a tool for precisely describing data
governance elements and the interconnections between
them, and simplifying the complexity when designing
data governance in PEs [6].
In this paper, we aim to provide an overall design
approach for data governance in PEs that can be used
by practitioners to focus on important data governance
issues and to develop an effective data governance
strategy and design for business success.
The next section provides a literature review. We
explain the methodology of this study in section 3.
Section 4 introduces our data governance architecture.
It presents design principles which should be followed,
contingency factors to help platform owners’ decisionmaking for design choices (centralized or decentralized
type), and a data governance architecture model. We
focus on decentralized data governance which needs to
tackle more complexity. Section 5 shows case studies
to illustrate the practical implications of our
suggestion. We then conclude and discuss the
limitations of the study.
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2. Literature review
Data governance includes processes, policies and
structures for comprehensive control. Traditional
organizations can easily handle participants
(employees) and the relationship between them. Yet,
platform owners have limited power and ability to fully
control platforms as there are multiple parties
contributing, deriving and using data [5, 7]. In this
different context, how to design data governance
effectively aligning the business goals and platform
concepts have not been discussed in detail.
Design principles addressed in prior research show
the fundamental considerations in designing platform
governance. Transparent, fair, simple, realistic, shared
value, and participation are identified as the main
principles [4, 6]. The literature discusses not only the
principles but also the business influence like costs,
benefit, or platform growth. However, there is an
absence of explanation about how the principles can be
affected by different types of governance design (e.g.
centralized or decentralized). A data governance type
is determined by a platform owners’ design choice.
While centralized governance means that a platform
owner takes all control and responsibility,
decentralized governance shares them with platform
users. A number of studies have addressed design
choices (how to balance ownership/power of all sides
in the ecosystems) [6, 10]. Hein et al. [11] addressed
governance structure, which refers to centralized or
decentralized governance as a critical mechanism. The
authors claimed that it involves how the authority and
responsibility for decision-making is divided among
participating groups. Schreieck et al. [10] also
described the distribution of power in PEs. Those prior
studies, however, do not focus on data, and thus how
data governance should be designed is not discussed.
According to “contingency theory”, the relationship
between some characteristic of an organization and the
organization’s effectiveness is determined by
contingencies [40]. The theory respects the fact that
each PE needs a specific data governance configuration
by looking at current and future context or strategy. It
helps platform owners to systematically analyze their
contingencies and to select a better choice. However,
the use of the theory in data governance has received
little attention. Weber et al. [8] applied the theory to
data governance, and it is reported as the first study.
The authors proposed a contingency model for
designing data governance, emphasizing the model
contributes to the business goals of a company. The
study has a focus on the general context for an
enterprise. It lacks consideration of how it can be
applied in a different business context such as PEs. We
reviewed literature on PE to find useful ideas, and thus

to overcome the limitation of the model. A network
effect for platform‘s growth and profit [2, 13-17],
platform governance mechanisms and strategies,
single/multi-homing, platform maturity and open
strategy [16, 17], control mechanisms [6, 10, 11, 18],
and different types of market structures [3] are
addressed as key aspects of platform governance.
These aspects, however, have not been explained in
terms of how they are related to data governance.
Based on the contingencies of PEs, platform
owners can decide their governance type. When a
platform owner chooses decentralized data governance,
he needs to handle a more complex architecture. It is
necessary to consider the decision domains that need to
be shared, and who should make the decisions.
Decision domains of data governance for PEs are
proposed by Lee et al. [5]. The authors identified seven
data governance factors for PEs: data ownership/access
definition, regulatory environment, contribution
measurement, data use case, conformance, monitoring
and data provenance. The factors are used to place
decision rights between platform owners and users at
design time. A decentralized data governance
architecture describes all those considerations in a
structural design to reduce the complexity [6].
To help successful implementation of a
decentralized architecture, technical considerations are
also important. Blockchain is identified as one of the
possible technologies. It has emerged to support a
digital currency based on a peer-to-peer network
without trusted authorities [37]. It has been recently
highlighted as decentralized governance for data
provenance or data ownership [37, 39]. Choudary and
Van Alstyne [4] noted that blockchain is one of the
most innovative and revolutionary governance forms,
and supports trustworthy interactions based on
decentralized architecture. It enables transparent and
trustworthy governance as any transaction in the
blockchain is verified by every node, and permanently
recorded. Based on the mechanisms, Zyskind et al. [39]
proposed a decentralized personal data management
system to achieve a transparent data supply chain, data
ownership and privacy. The data provenance issue is
addressed in Liang et al. [36] through a provenance
database and a blockchain network to provide temperproof records for transparency of data accountability.
These studies, however, overlook the complicated
relationships and context which can occur in PEs
through multiple participating groups, various types of
data and a complex data supply chain.
In conclusion, all available existing data
governance sources from scholars and practitioners
only focus on organizational concern. Moreover,
platform governance studies fall short of attention to
data governance.
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3. Methodology
This study is based on two main methodologies: a
literature review and case study (Figure 1).

contingency factors and decentralized model. We
analyzed the influence of the contingency factors on
the data governance design choices of the platforms,
and illustrated the possibility of the concept and
technical requirements of our data governance model.

4. Data governance architecture
4.1. The principles of design

Figure 1. Overview of the research process
We conducted three steps for the literature review:
keyword search, backward and forward search, and
literature review based on selection criteria. Firstly we
broadly searched to find the literature which addresses
PE strategy, governance concepts and mechanisms.
The main keywords were used “((platform ecosystem
OR multi-sided platform OR two-sided platform) AND
(governance OR management))”. The selection criteria
was “Include concepts, strategy, or governance
mechanisms in the context of PE”. We excluded the
papers that are not related to platform governance, too
high level topics (e.g. overview), specific domains and
technologies or not academic. We then performed a
quick
review
(abstract/introduction/conclusion)
followed by backward and forward search and a full
content review. We repeated the three steps to narrow
down the search scope or to find the literature which
has specific topic with different keywords and
selection criteria. For instance, “(blockchain AND
governance)” were used for our decentralized
governance architecture model. We chose the papers
which address data governance domains of PEs such as
ownership, data provenance or contribution. We also
used the literature searched in previous studies [5].
Case studies were carried out to illustrate our
suggestion: the contingency factors and decentralized
governance model. We used currently running or
developed platforms for the studies. We chose two
(Platform A and B) undergoing different business
stages, which provide platforms and support
participation of multiple user groups. Data collection
was performed by document analysis (Platform A and
B), survey of the web sites (Platform A), and
interviews (Platform B). The context of Platform A
was described by one of the authors of this paper in the
beginning as she worked with the platform in the past.
The interviews for Platform B were conducted with
two members of the platform, using eight closed/fixedresponse questions and two standardized/open-ended
questions. We analyzed the collected data using the

We begin by introducing the principles which
should be considered for designing good data
governance in the context of PEs. We identify six
fundamental principles: transparent, fair, simple,
realistic, shared value and participation [4, 6].
Transparent means that platform governance
should give a clear view to every participant. It
includes internal transparency for platform companies
themselves and external transparency for platform
users. Fair is relevant to applicable rules for everyone.
There should not be inconsistent rules, and thus
governance policies should be equally applied to all
participating groups. In addition, every participant
should be given the same opportunity and accessibility.
Fairness results in more participation and ideas, and
after all it leads to new innovation [4]. Moreover, it
makes more wise and productive use of data in PEs
[34]. Simple presents that data governance in PEs
should be designed and implemented as efficiently and
effectively as possible by making its structure simple.
It is strongly related to costs and benefit of platforms.
Realistic data governance can be realized by starting
with a good understanding of what governance
practices are applicable and how they work based on
design choices and trend (toward centralized or
decentralized). Shared value is a management strategy
which should be delivered to all participants. Data
governance design, therefore, should contain the
strategy, and it should be implemented through the
realized systems. Participation presents that platform
owners should give all participating groups of PEs a
chance to join decision-making processes in certain
ways. In decentralized data governance, it can be
highly encouraged and implemented.
The principles should be considered for both design
types (centralized/decentralized). Yet, the degree of
achievement of each principle can be different. Figure
2 shows decentralized data governance supports a
higher expectation of transparency, shared value and
participation. If a platform focuses on trust-based
governance or less/no restriction to platform users, the
platform is more visible and easy to participate and
have a common consensus between participants. It is
made possible by sharing power and control of
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decision-making with platform users. In decentralized
data governance, platform owners should understand,
consider, and reflect platform users’ needs and
characteristics, and it might be more difficult than in
centralized data governance. Thus, it can lead to less
realistic data governance. In contrast, centralized data
governance enables simpler and more realistic data
governance since platform owners do not need to
consider platform users’ issues as much. “Fair” might
not be affected by any design choice.

adopted from a previous contingency model for data
governance (Weber et al. model) [8] and platform
governance studies [2-4, 6, 8-11, 13, 16-21, 27, 29, 3133]. Weber et al.’s model provides generic contingency
factors for an enterprise which are derived from prior
research and workshops with practitioners. The factors
are identified for data governance, and thus useful as a
basis of this study. We differentiate them by focusing
on platform governance characteristics (Figure 4).
Weber et al.’s
contingency factors
Performance strategy
Diversification breath
Degree of market regulation
Organization structure
Competitive strategy
Process harmonization

→

Contingency factors for PEs
(our suggestion)
Platform strategy
Modified
Multi-homing strategy
Modified
Degree of market regulation Selected
Governance configuration
Modified
Platform market structure
Modified
Process harmonization
Deleted
Open strategy (new)
Added
Platform maturity (new)
Added

Figure 4. Contingency factors
Figure 2. Design choices and principles

4.2. Contingency factors
Depending on platform owners’ design choice,
platforms can expect different advantages (Table 1). It
is necessary to think about what platform contingencies
affect design choices to find the best choice and thus to
get business success of each PE (Figure 3).
Table 1. Centralized vs. decentralized governance
Perspective
Design
Centralized Pros
data
governance
Cons

Platform owners

Easy to control user
behaviors and to align
business goals/strategies
Slow growing and lots of
resources
Decentralized Pros Reduce effort, increase
growing and user
data
satisfaction/participation
governance
Cons Hard to control platforms
and user behaviors and to
change goals/strategies

Platform users
High quality of data or
services (including strong
security)
Invisible platforms, lack of
trust and accessibility
Enhance trust and increase
motivation and benefit
expectation
Complicated processes,
slow decision-making and
less secure

Figure 3. Design choices and contingency factors
To support right decision-making of platform
owners, we suggest the contingency factors which are

First of all, we examined Weber et al.’s model to
select applicable factors for PEs. We selected “degree
of market regulation” as regulatory environment is also
an important factor in using data in PEs [5]. Secondly,
we removed “process harmonization” because it refers
to business processes of an enterprise. Next, we
modified the remaining factors to adjust to PEs’
situations through a literature review. Four factors
were modified: “platform strategy”, “multi-homing
strategy”, “governance configuration” and “platform
market structure”. The factors align with the basic
concepts of Weber et al.’s model, but they differ in the
definition and range of each factor. Lastly, we found
new factors which are not addressed in the referred
model. We identified two factors (“open strategy” and
“platform maturity”) as new factors. The factors are
commonly discussed when addressing platform
governance in academic literature. In total, we identify
seven contingency factors which influence the design
choices of data governance in PEs (Table 2).
Platform strategy— Weill and Ross [13] addressed
profit and growth of organizations to measure IT
governance performance. Weber et al. [8] adopted this
concept to data governance contingency. The authors
noted that if an organization focuses on profit, the
decision-making authority in governance will be
toward centralization. In contrast, if growth is
emphasized, the governance will be decentralized. In
the context of PEs, however, profit and growth can be
achieved at the same time thanks to network effects of
PEs. As PEs are increasing revenue based on data from
platform users, low quality of data issues are also
rising [19]. Some platforms have addressed the issues
by adopting formal control or monitoring to drive out
low quality data [8]. However, strict control for high
quality in centralized governance can make
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Table 2. Contingency factors for data governance in PEs
Contingency factor

Definition (trend: centralized <-> decentralized)

Platform strategy

Performance objective of a PE
(quality <-> profit or growth)
Multi-homing strategy
Degree of affiliation in a PE (single-home <-> multi-home)
Degree of market regulation Degree of regulation regarding the use of data in a PEs
(highly regulated <-> no regulation)
Governance Governance Type of governance of a PE
Configuration mechanisms (authority-based <- contract-based -> trust-based)
governance)
Control
Type
of control of a PE (formal <-> informal control)
mechanisms
Platform market structures Type of platform market structures based on competition
(monopoly platforms <- intersecting -> coincident)
Open strategy
Level of openness of a PE (close <-> open)
Platform maturity

Relevant data governance factor
Data ownership/access definition, data use case,
conformance, monitoring
Data ownership/access definition and use case
regulatory environment, conformance

Contribution measurement, conformance, monitoring,
data provenance
Data ownership/access definition, conformance,
monitoring, data provenance
Data ownership/access definition, data use case,
monitoring, data provenance
Data ownership/access definition, data use case,
monitoring, data provenance
Level of maturity of a PE (mature platforms <-> immature) Contribution measurement, monitoring, data provenance

platform growth slow. Multi-homing strategy—
Some platform owners require their partners to
affiliate exclusively with them to offer novel content
(single-home). Meanwhile, some platforms allow
affiliation with competing platforms to encourage
participation (multi-home): e.g. multiple payment
cards in EBay [3, 17]. Multi-homing is related to
openness. If a platform chooses “open”, less
permission rule to the users is followed [16, 17]. It
means
governance
should
move
toward
decentralization to share decision rights [6]. Degree
of market regulation— This factor is adopted from
the existing model [8] as it is consistent with concern
of regulatory environment of data governance in PEs
[5]. A highly regulated environment requires more
centralized data governance for compliance. On the
contrary, less (or no) regulation might enable
platform owners to divide decision rights through a
decentralized
approach.
Governance
configuration— Governance mechanisms can be
categorized into three: authority-based, contractbased and trust-based [18, 20]. Authority-based
mechanisms can be realized within centralized
governance by employing the platform owner’s
power to enforce desirable behavior based on
policies. Trust-based mechanisms are used for
gaining a certain amount of participants, and then
attracting other side users. The mechanisms are
generally combined with strong incentives to reach
the desired goal [2, 18]. In general, authority-based
mechanisms are related to formal control like input,
output or behavior control, but trust-based
mechanisms are enabled by informal control such as
clan/social control [18, 21] in decentralized
governance. A contract-based mechanism needs less
formality, but still prohibits the unauthorized
behavior in using data in platforms. Platform market
structures— Platform market structures (coincident,
intersecting, and monopoly) have been addressed
under platform competition concerns [3]. Coincident
platforms are recognized when there is too much
competition in the market; supply sides (n) > demand

Reference
[3, 8, 13, 19]
[8, 16, 17]
[8, 9, 27, 29, 30]
[6, 18, 20, 21]

[3, 17, 31]
[4, 10, 11, 17, 32]
[2, 4, 10, 11, 17, 33]

sides (m). Monopoly refers to having no competition:
n = 1. Coincident platforms (in particular, entrants)
might be necessary to be more attractive than
incumbent platforms. They tend to be open and share
the platforms to encourage users’ participation and to
win market [17]. Monopoly leans to centralized
governance to strictly control the platforms. Open
strategy— Open strategy is an important part of the
design of a PE [10, 11]. A platform owner opens the
platform when there is lack of resources, need for
adoption or innovation [17]. If the degree of openness
increases, platform users can easily access the
platforms, and platform owners need to share control
with users [10]. In consequence, it is toward
decentralized. Yet, limited openness leads to high
process control, quality and user satisfaction: e.g.
Apple’s app store [4, 11]. Platform maturity— A
newcomer platform has more permissive governance
to enhance participation and to reach critical mass
when market share is small [17]. To attain enough
growth, a platform owner needs less restriction but
more trust to attract and lock the users in the platform
[4, 10]. In particular, trust is regarded as a
prerequisite for a PE to survive among competitors
[10, 11, 33]. Thus, less mature platforms tend to
prefer multi-homing, open and less negotiation (share
control) to capture the benefits of growth. In contrast,
when market share is large enough (at maturity),
governance has a tendency to be toward tighter
control [17].
As shown in Table 2, each contingency has a
relationship with particular data governance factors.
The data governance factors should be focused and
enforced based on the linked contingency. For
instance, if a platform aims for high quality
performance, the platform needs to strengthen data
ownership and access control based on clear data use
cases [9, 13, 22, 23] for strict responsibility and
accountability of data quality [19]. Conformance and
monitoring should also be followed to improve
quality. Meanwhile, a PE which adopts a trust-based
governance needs to think about a certain reward for
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data contributors to encourage participants [18, 24,
25]. Shared conformance, monitoring and data
provenance should be considered to achieve visibility
of a data supply chain for trust between a platform
owner and users [26-28]. In the same vein, degree of
market regulation is strongly related to regulatory
environment and conformance to avoid serious court
issues [9, 27, 29, 30].

4.3. Data governance architecture model
A centralized governance architecture is simpler
as there are only internal issues to consider. In
contrast, a decentralized architecture needs to deal
with complicated relationships and interactions
among multi-sided networks of participants. To cope
with this complexity, we present how to partition data
governance control power with platform users. We
then propose a decentralized architecture model and
the technical considerations. Blockchain is
introduced as a possible technology which can
support our model.
4.3.1. The locus of data governance. To encourage
participation of platform users and to achieve
visibility of PEs, some governance practices need to
be directly implemented by platform users. We
partition the governance factors and practices
introduced in the literature review section (Table 3).

how to use the data in PEs for business goals.
Understanding and defining different types/sources of
data are thus very important to platform owners [9,
35]. In these cases, platform users’ participation is
little. However, the mechanisms and consequence of
decision-making by platform owners should be
disclosed to all participant groups [5]. In addition,
platform users also need to clearly know and
understand who, when and how uses their data [26].
However, prior research and case studies claim a lack
of user contribution model and invisible data usage as
critical challenges [5, 10, 24-26] even though user
contribution measurement has been considered as a
key mechanism to support revenue sharing and
business success [5, 24, 25]. To encourage high
visibility and fair and clear contribution
measurement, decentralized data governance should
play a critical role by enabling platform users to
monitor and validate the whole process and history of
the use of data in a supply chain [6, 9, 26].
4.3.2. Architecture overview. As illustrated in
Figure 5, we suggest our decentralized model for PEs
based on the design principles and data governance
partitioning mentioned in the previous sections.

Table 3. Data governance partitioning
Governance
factor

Locus of data governance
Platform owner side

Data owner- . Define data ownership and
ship/access
access rights
Regulatory . Identify relevant
environment regulations, laws or cases
. Develop/use decision
models for data ownership/access definition
Contribution . Develop contribution
measurement measurement models
. Measure/notify the
contribution to the owner
Data use case . Define data categories and
use cases
Conformance . Build processes/rules
. Audit processes/rules
Monitoring . Monitor/view all data
activities(events)
. Notify specific events to the
data owner
. Review user report and
response to the reporter
Data
. Identify or authenticate data
Provenance
owner

Platform user side
. View data ownership and
access rights
-

Figure 5. Decentralized data governance

. Measure the contribution of
data
. View the defined
categories and use cases
. Audit processes/rules
. Monitor/view activities (or
events) regarding uploaded
/generated user data
. Report misuse/abuse of
data
. Trace the history of the
used of data

Platform owners should carefully consider the
regulatory environment to correctly define data
ownership and access rights based on the identified
legal aspects [9]. Platform owners also need to define

There are three main entities, which interact with
each other: platform users (data providers, consumers
and user groups), closed and open data governance.
The closed governance is for platform owners. It
supports internal practices like data ownership/access
definition and contribution models. The open data
governance enables every platform user to fairly
access platform data and transparently see or audit all
activities and events of platforms. The following
describes the interactions in detail.
(0) Platform owners should set up environment
prior to occurrence of the interactions. It includes
developing models for data ownership/access and
contribution measurement, and defining data
categories/use cases, aligning the business objectives
and strategies. (1) Data providers can upload or
generate during their use of PEs. The data is stored in
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the closed data governance systems as raw data. (2)
The information of raw data is registered in the open
data governance as a form of metadata according to
the predefined data categories and the purpose of the
use of data. The registered data is exposed to any
platform users who want to use them. (3) Data
consumers can search and require the registered data.
(4) Verifying data integrity, checking access
permission, and auditing the processes are
implemented by platform user groups through the
open data governance systems to avoid data abuse or
misuse (To enable user groups’ participation for these
activities, some technical considerations and
mechanisms should be considered. We will discuss
this in the next section in detail). (5) In order to check
data access permission, the closed data governance
should provide correct information of raw data based
on the data ownership and access definition. (6)(7)
According to the feedback of the open data
governance, data consumers can receive the data via
the raw data repository in the closed data governance.
(8) Platform owners measure the contribution and
reward the contributors as they create or add value in
the use of data. (9) The owners of the data can see all
the events and trace the history of the use of the data
during the transaction and/or after. Furthermore, the
open data governance can automatically measure the
contribution of data based on the usage of data.
This model highly enhances transparency and
participation of PEs by providing an open data
governance platform. All participating groups can
share control, value and culture, and clearly see the
use of data. Platform owners can reduce costs and
efforts by partially handing over some parts of their
control power to platform users.
4.3.3. Technical considerations. To discuss how the
suggested model is implemented, we identify the
technical requirements. Firstly, the open data
governance should be completely open to every
platform user. It also should be decentralized without
any intervention of platform owners. Meanwhile, the
closed data governance needs to be invisible and
protected. The two separated governances, however,
have to cooperate/collaborate with each other to keep
consistency and integrity of data, and seamless
services. Secondly, security issues should be
considered as the governance model allows any
participants (platform users) to join the open data
governance system. To support this, all
activities/events which take place in PEs have to be
safely preserved/recorded. It can also improve clear
data ownership and provenance. The recording can
be used to prevent or detect denial of data usage or
data manipulation by someone including platform

owners. This is important because it is necessary to
improve transparency of PEs, where there are
multiple participating groups and thus there are
worries of data abuse/misuse and privacy violation
[5]. Lastly, decision making by user groups by
auditing the processes/data should be clear and
stable, and implemented by reasonable mechanisms.
Blockchain technology meets the requirements
mentioned above. It provides a shared and distributed
architecture [36-39]. Based on the concept, the
hashed data of raw data (uploaded data by platform
users) can be generated and transferred to the open
data governance. This enables the two governance
(closed and open) to be independent, but still keeps
data security, consistency and integrity by verifying
the hash code against the raw (original) data. Once
the hashed data embedded in the transaction by the
blockchain network (the open data governance in our
model), the data becomes immutable. This is possible
since every participant of the blockchain network
stores the data as a form of a cryptographicallysigned chain. Thus, it is nearly impossible to change
the data [37] unless someone can own enough
computational power to invalidate the chain. This
mechanism satisfies our needs regarding security and
data provenance. In addition, auditing every
transaction for the use of data and making a decision
can be conducted by every participant’s voting. It is
implemented with clear rules without platform
owners’ intervention. Therefore it is regarded as a
trustworthy and transparent mechanism.

5. Case study
We conduct case studies on two platforms
(Platform A and B). First of all, we compare the
platforms based on our contingency factors (Table 4).
We illustrate how the governance design types are
characterized depending on the different context.
Secondly, we analyze Platform B in detail to show
the practical implication of the decentralized
architecture model suggested here.
Platform A is a content portal which was
launched four years ago. Through the platform,
software assets (development knowledge or
documents) are provided and reused by IT companies
or individual developers. To encourage user
participation, it provides several types of benefits to
the participants: e.g. subsidy and seeding like UI/UX
guide. The government supports the platform by
legislating the rule that every government SW R&D
project should register the outcome to the platform.
According to the result of the case study, Platform A
tends toward centralized. The market regulation and
platform
maturity
of
the
platform
lead
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Table 4. The results of the case studies on platform A and platform B
Platform A -> Toward “Centralized Data Governance”
Contingency factors and the context

Trend

Platform B -> Toward “Decentralized Data Governance”
Contingency factors and the context

* Platform strategy: Quality
Centralized * Platform strategy: Growth
The business goal is reputation and satisfaction of users. Thus, it
The purpose of the platform is to share as much data as possible,
aims at high quality of data rather than growth of the platform. Profit
and the quality of data is not a big concern of the platform.
is not considered as the platform is a non-profit platform.
Thus, it aims at growth of the platform.
*Multi-homing strategy: Single-home
Centralized *Multi-homing strategy: Multi-home
It tends to prohibit multi-homing for high reputation/differentiation.
In order to open the platform to everyone and to gain more data
from providers, the platform allows multi-homing.
Decentralized *Degree of market regulation: No (less) regulation
*Degree of market regulation: No (less) regulation
Every uploaded data is public data based on the prerequisite of the
The data stored in the platform is basically public data to open to
platform policies (except user information). There is less amount of
everyone as there is no raw data and personal information. The
sensitive data: e.g. personal identifiable information.
platform has only metadata provided by data owners.
*Governance configuration: Authority-based/Formal control
Centralized *Governance configuration: Trust-based/Informal control
There are strict/formal control processes and clear ownership
Reputation mechanisms will be used by platform users. Users’
mechanisms by the platform owner.
reputation score can be used for input control by the government.
*Platform market structures: Monopoly
Centralized *Platform market structures: Intersecting
As the platform is supported by the government, the platform
There are some identified competitors (e.g. data.gov.au and the
dominates the market as a monopoly platform.
other government platforms). However, there is no serious
competition.
*Open strategy: Close
Centralized *Open strategy: Open
It tends to open to demand side users, but still requires login first
The strategy of the platform is completely open. There is no any
(only authorized users can access to the platform for the use of data
restriction to join the platform, and thus everyone can equally use
in the platform). For supply side, the platform is relatively closed as
the data in the platform. Platform users only need to login using
it requires high quality and reputation.
blockchain accounts.
Decentralized *Platform maturity: Immature
*Platform maturity: Immature
The platform launched four years ago, but it is still considered as an
The platform has not started its business yet.
immature platform due to the growth rate of data and users.

to decentralized governance, but the other factors show
centralized governance trend of the platform.
Meanwhile, Platform B has not officially started the
service yet. The project team recently finished the
prototype system, and thus it is in the very initial
phase. The platform is an open data registry platform.
It allows data owners to upload data, and data analysts
can use the data for analytics jobs. The data owners can
monetize their data since it provides payment systems.
According to the interviews and document review, the
governance trend is decentralized. The vision of the
platform is open, and thus it aims to share data with
every participant. Since the governance trend of
Platform B is identified as decentralized, we carry out
an in-depth analysis to illustrate how our decentralized
model (Figure 5) can be implemented in the real world.
We survey the platform in three dimensions:
architecture, process and function.
Architecture— Platform B is developed based on
blockchain. There are two entities named “on-chain
and off-chain” based on the existence of a blockchain
network. In the off-chain (without a blockchain
network), there are hosted raw data, and usage policy
specification and a policy checker. Meanwhile, dataset
and analytics job registries which interact with data
consumer (data analyst) and data provider are in the
on-chain. The on-chain also includes modules for
tamper-proof and payment to support high security and
monetization. Process— Data providers can register
datasets on blockchain. Data consumers can post
analytics jobs with the requirements and measurement
criteria of datasets. They can select the datasets which

Trend
Decentralized

Decentralized

Decentralized

Decentralized

Blended

Decentralized

Decentralized

meets the requirements among the registered datasets.
The platform conducts policy compliance checking to
validate if the access to the datasets is valid. Lastly, the
data analysts run the analytics jobs with the datasets,
and pay for the datasets. Function— The main
functions of the platform are dataset and analytics job
registration, policy checking and payment. The
additional functions are dashboards for data consumers
and data owners. It supports presentation views which
show the results of data searching and policy checking,
the contribution of each dataset selected by data
consumers, and the profit of data owners.
The overall concept is similar to our architecture
model. Raw data is stored in the off-chain and only
metadata is provided to the on-chain network. This
mechanism helps more privacy of datasets as it stays
far from direct exposure to public. The platform
utilizes advantages of blockchain such as transparency,
secure and stable services, or fairness. This case can be
a good reference of a practical governance model
which can be used in industry. However, there are
some limitations which should be dealt with for PEs.
First of all, there is a lack of consideration of a
scalability issue. Majority PEs may produce a large
amount of data every day, and have various types of
data. For instance, Facebook has more than 70
categories of data [5]. All types of data do not need to
be opened to or shared with platform users. It is
necessary to categorize and filter data before
transferring them to an open platform. It is able to
reduce the burden of data processing for better
performance. Secondly, while the open data registry
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focuses on simple and clear data ownership and
contribution, data governance in PEs should deal with
multiple parties contributing, deriving and using data.
This concern results in complicated relationships,
ownership and contribution measurement [5]. Platform
B, in particular, cannot answer the question of how to
measure the contribution of shared or derived data
which may involve multiple data owners through
transformation or analysis. Lastly, the policy
compliance checker is only applicable for tabular data
focusing on ETL (extract, transform and load) phase.
As PEs generally deal with various types of data
including video, audio, text and geographic data.
Different mechanisms should be adopted.
To sum up our case studies, we showed that our
contingency factors are applicable to systematically
analyze and characterize the data governance design of
PEs. For currently running platforms (e.g. Platform A),
the contingency factors can be used to review current
governance direction. For a newcomer (e.g. Platform
B), it enables to examine if the vision and strategies of
the platform align with the data governance design
choice. The interviewees gave a positive feedback that
our suggestion is effective and useful to analyze their
context and to help decision-making for governance
design choices. One interviewee noted that different
types of users (providers and consumers) need to be
considered
when
analyzing
the
governance
configuration. We also illustrated the concept and
technical approach of our architecture model by indepth analysis of Platform B. The interviewee’s
comment and the identified limitations from the case
studies will be addressed in the future research.

6. Conclusion and limitations
In this paper, we proposed a data governance
architecture for PEs. We discussed data governance
design choices (centralized or decentralized), and
contingency factors to support decision-making. We
also proposed an architecture model for decentralized
data governance based on the design principles
suggested in this paper. We introduced blockchain
technologies which support our model. To illustrate the
practical implications of our suggestion, we carried out
case studies on two platform ecosystems.
In order to provide in-depth understanding and
knowledge of data governance and PE, we conducted a
literature review following three steps: keyword
search, backward/forward search and literature review.
The suggested contingency factors which influence
data governance design of PEs, were differentiated
from prior studies based on the characteristics,
strategy, and governance concepts and mechanisms of
PEs. The case studies were performed by applying our

contingency factors with survey and interviews. We
showed how the factors can be used in the real world.
The decentralized governance model was also
illustrated through a case study on a blockchain-based
system which implements decentralized data
governance. We also identified significant challenges
which should be addressed in the future research.
This study has several limitations. The case studies
conducted are not sufficient to validate our models.
One of the case studies was carried out using a
qualitative description of the author’s working
experiences and information from the document
analysis. We conducted only two interviews for the
other case. In addition, our architecture model should
be implemented to clearly show if the model is
applicable in the real world. At the same time, an
extensive and a systematic literature review should be
considered to refine our study.
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